This article examines the role the Moscow-Washington Hotline played in the 1967 Six-Day War, focusing on the Soviet side. We argue that the Soviet Union used the Direct Communication Link much more broadly than had been intended when the Hotline was agreed on in 1963 mainly because Moscow did not assign the Hotline any special diplomatic significance. We also show that the Hotline is a poor channel for crisis negotiations, and its efficacy as a communication tool is compromised if regular diplomatic channels cannot match its speed. Finally, we challenge the existing debate in the historiography of the Six-Day War, arguing for the importance of studying the implications of Soviet behaviour rather than Soviet intentions. Day War. We show that the Soviet leadership used the Hotline more creatively than the original purpose behind its creation would suggest, and viewed it as one of many toolsand not necessarily a unique one -in their diplomatic arsenal. We also show that, notwithstanding its many other advantages, the Hotline was and is a poor channel for crisis negotiations, and that its efficacy as a communication tool is compromised if regular diplomatic channels cannot match its speed.
The Hotline was a device intended to reduce anxiety and, with it, the risk of triggering nuclear war in emergency situations, by making rapid and reliable leader-toleader communication possible. It would give leaders the opportunity to share information, signal urgency, communicate their intentions, propose joint action, engage in negotiations, clear up misunderstandings and explain unforeseen, and potentially fatal, events before a crisis could escalate into war. As a confidential channel, it would allow leaders to discuss their differences in private -away from the public eye and the need to produce inflammatory Cold War rhetoric. The direct involvement of principal decision-makers could facilitate the elimination of bureaucratic red tape and bureaucratically compromised outcomes. A written teletype link was chosen over the originally proposed telephone connection, because the latter could easily have increased -rather than decreased -the risk of war through hasty decisions, emotional outbursts, awkwardly phrased statements and mistranslations. In contrast, teletype was judged to be a cooler medium that would give decision-makers more time to consider their response and the consequences of their words. 8 However, as we show in this article, the velocity of transmission brought its own problems, because the DCL, in replacing more traditional diplomatic tools, precluded the spending of time on gathering the sort of valuable information that might have been forthcoming through these slower channels.
Despite the popularity of the Hotline as a subject for online, print-magazine and newspaper stories, 9 it has garnered much less attention from the academic community.
Many studies that mention but are not directly concerned with the Hotline devote only a few pages to it, 10 while the few studies that focus exclusively on it are either descriptive or prescriptive in nature. 11 Only four articles take a somewhat more analytical approach, but even these fail to provide a focused inquiry into the Hotline's use, as they either lack a well-defined research question, 12 are short of evidence to support their conclusions, 13 or focus on the symbolism of the Hotline rather than its use. 14 The lack of analytical research may be explained, in part, by the fact that this is not an easy subject to research, with only the Hotline correspondence created during the Oren, on the other hand, contend that the USSR supported the removal of UN peacekeepers but not the closing of the Straits. 30 Finally, Ginor and Remez assert that the Soviets knew of, and supported, both Egyptian actions. 31 Concerning Soviet intentions, the traditionalist view holds that the Soviet Union worked for peace from the moment when the crisis erupted. 32 Revisionists, however, whilst agreeing that the Soviet Union started to work for peace on 5 June, in order to prevent a superpower confrontation, 33 contend that it did so only with reluctance, and that it rekindled plans for intervention after Israel started a ground war against Syria on 9 June. 34 Other scholars assert that the Soviet Union first reaped the harvest of Nasser's moves early in the crisis, and propose various dates in between as the starting point for Soviet peace efforts. Very little is known about the origins of the Soviet messages. However, given the strongly collective nature of the Soviet leadership at the time, and the seriousness of the occasion, it can be safely assumed that most -perhaps all -of the messages were the product of Politburo deliberation. The fact that the Politburo, which was the highest decision-making body in the Soviet Union, was in session throughout the six days of the war also supports such a conclusion. Thus, while the style and length of American messages reflected Johnson's energetic, verbose and outgoing personality, the Soviet messages were less personal products, even if they fitted well with Premier Kosygin's dour and pragmatic style.
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The Hotline Remains Silent (12 May-4 June 1967)
As revisionists would expect, the Hotline remained silent between 12 May and 4 June despite the continuing deterioration of the situation. Certainly, after 28 May, this silence did not indicate a lack of need for more direct communication between the superpowers to prevent war. However, it was consistent with the generally uncooperative Soviet behaviour of the period: the Soviet Union rejected every opportunity for negotiations, 38 and seemed only to work toward preventing the United States from intervening, rather than toward stopping the war. with a few hours' delay through regular diplomatic channels. Furthermore, the vagueness of the message causes us to question the extent to which the Soviet Union was ready to work for peace, especially in the short term. Unlike the first American message from Rusk to Gromyko after the outbreak of the Six-Day War, 51 which had suggested concrete steps to be taken, Kosygin's missive contained only a general desire to end the military conflict and a hint that peace should result from American pressure on Israel. It contained no specific references to any role the Soviet Union might intend to play in achieving peace. 52 The Soviet public statement, which was issued on the evening of 5 June and used much stronger language, supported the more revisionist interpretation. The statement repeated the general Soviet commitment to peace, and contained the first Soviet reference to the United Nations, demanding that the UN should condemn Israel and take the necessary steps to restore peace. As in the case of Kosygin's Hotline message, this public address failed to specify the Soviet role in the peace process or to invoke a spirit of cooperation. Instead, the statement repeated Kosygin's subtle threat of independent Soviet action if necessary. 53 This was in stark contrast with Rusk's telegram to Gromyko and Johnson's reply to Kosygin via the Hotline on the same day, both of which were constructive and suggested that a solution be sought through negotiations in the UNSC. 54 Several other factors point to the conclusion that Soviet use of the Hotline on 5
June represented a step already calculated, and the Politburo, which convened at noon on 5 June for an emergency session, only approved a pre-existing plan. Perhaps, as revisionists argue, this use was part of a larger ploy to buy time for the Arab states who, the Politburo believed, could win the war only if it was allowed to be fought to a conclusion. 55 Kosygin had personally checked the Hotline machine and asked about its operational details before the eruption of the war, saying that the line might be needed soon. 56 Additionally, the Soviets had received detailed intelligence about the projected start of the war, 57 which would have made the preparation of a message in advance possible. Drafting written documents some time before their promulgation was common practice in Moscow: for example, the Soviet public statement intended for 23 May 1967 had been drafted and distributed several days ahead of time. 58 Moreover, governmentcontrolled Soviet media also broadcast reports on 5 June that we know had been written before the fighting began. 59 Finally, there is evidence that at first Ambassador Fedorenko received no new instructions after the outbreak of the war; and later, during the night of 5-6 June, the new instructions he did receive from Moscow had a wait-andsee tone and did not substantially differ from previous instructions. 60 Taken together, the above evidence suggests that Moscow was playing for time and, accordingly, that the Hotline message was intended as a diversion.
The pre-drafting of Kosygin's Hotline message would explain what we now see as its historical inconsistencies, and a lack of urgency in its language which was in sharp contrast with both the behaviour of some of the Soviet leadership and the battlefield misfortunes of Soviet allies. 61 Despite the general battle fog, 62 the Politburo, at the very least, must have been aware of the earliest developments by 15:45, when the Hotline message was sent. At 10:15, the Soviet embassy in Cairo certainly knew that the Egyptian Air Force and the largest Egyptian air base had been destroyed. 63 Moreover, the fact that the later Hotline message only referred to the fighting between Israel and Egypt (even though Syria -the apple of Moscow's eye -and Jordan had also been involved, and heavily outgunned, in the fighting for hours by the time the message was sent) also points toward the conclusion that the message was drafted before the war started. 64 Furthermore, Soviet first contact over the Hotline was an independent initiative, not triggered by Rusk's letter to Gromyko earlier in the day, which serves as additional evidence for the message being pre-planned. 65 his facts since 'you know where our carriers are'. 81 While Kuznetsov had already told
Guthrie that not everything that appeared in Izvestija was the official position of the Soviet government, 82 Johnson's complaint, delivered via the Hotline, was taken more seriously in Moscow. Even though Kosygin personally never believed Nasser's accusations of American participation in the war, 83 an enquiry was launched among Soviet ships in the Mediterranean as to whether American planes had participated in the fighting against Egypt. The answer was negative, confirming the American side of the story, and the charges disappeared from Soviet media thereafter. Nonetheless, and contrary to the intent of the Hotline's creation, the largely cooperative spirit of 7-9 June was punctuated by distrust and competition. Neither
Kosygin nor Johnson missed an opportunity to blame the other's allies, or to imply that the other superpower should work harder for peace. 94 Similarly, in the UN, Fedorenko outmanoeuvred Goldberg by introducing the 7 June resolution to set a deadline for a cease-fire without the customary bilateral consultations, and only apologised the next day in the face of American protest. 
